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ABSTRACT 
Cascaded events may cause a major blackout which will lead to a massive 
economic loss and even fatalities. Significant research efforts have been made to address 
the issue systematically: preventive mechanisms are designed to mitigate the impact of 
initiating events on power systems; emergency control methods are proposed to prevent 
power systems from entering an unstable state; restorative control methods are developed 
to stop the propagation of power system instability and to prevent widespread blackouts. 
This work contributes to the development of new emergency control methods and 
preventive mechanisms. 
First, a new emergency control scheme is proposed for preventing power systems 
from a loss of synchronism. Traditional out-of-step relays may fail to predict losses of 
synchronism as the dynamics of power systems become more and more complex. In 
recent years, the installation of the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) on power grids 
has increased significantly and, therefore, a large amount of real-time data is available for 
on-line monitoring of power system dynamics. This research proposes a PMU-based 
application for on-line monitoring of rotor angle stability. The Lyapunov Exponents are 
used to predict a loss of synchronism within large power systems. The relationship 
between rotor angle stability and the Maximal Lyapunov Exponent (MLE) is established. 
A computational algorithm is developed for the calculation of MLE in an operational 
environment. The effectiveness of the monitoring scheme is illustrated with a 3-machine 
system and a 200-bus system model. 
Then, a preventive mechanism against cyber attacks is developed. Cyber threats 
are serious concerns for power systems. For example, hackers may attack power control 
viii 
 
systems via the interconnected enterprise networks. This research proposes a risk 
assessment framework to enhance the resilience of power systems against cyber attacks. 
The Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM) is employed to 
evaluate identified security vulnerabilities within cyber systems of power systems 
quantitatively; The Attack Graph is used to identify possible intrusion scenarios that 
exploit multiple vulnerabilities; an Intrusion Response system (IRS) is developed to 
monitor the impact of intrusion scenarios on power system dynamics in real time. IRS 
calculates the Conditional Lyapunov Exponents (CLEs) on line based on PMU data. 
Power system stability is predicted through values of CLEs. Control actions based on 
CLEs will be suggested if power system instability is likely to happen. A generic wind 
farm control system is used for case study. The effectiveness of IRS is illustrated with the 
IEEE 39 bus system model. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Cascaded Events 
Cascaded events are identified as causes of recent large-scale blackouts around 
the world, such as the 1996 blackout in U.S. [1], the 2003 blackout in North America [2], 
the 2003 blackout in Italy [3], and the 2006 blackout in Europe [4]. The resultant 
blackouts brought about massive economic losses, widespread panics, and failures of 
essential services. For example, the 2003 blackout was estimated to cost about $6 billion 
[5], and it contributed to 11 reported fatalities. 
Normal Emergency Restorative
Subsequent 
events
Uncontrolled system 
splitting
Large-scale 
blackout
Initiating 
events
 
Fig.  1.1.   The common process of cascaded events 
Cascaded events in major blackouts follow a common process [6], as shown in 
Fig. 1.1. Typically, cascaded events are initiated by a single or multiple events, such as 
the 500-kV line outage (U.S. 1996), the generator tripping and 345-kV line outage (U.S. 
and Canada 2003), the line outage (Italy 2003) and the coupling operation of busbars at a 
substation (Europe 2006). The initiating events result in violations of operating 
constraints of power systems, and then drive systems from a normal state into an 
emergency state. The violations of operating constraints, if not corrected in time, can 
trigger successive line tripping and/or generator tripping events. These subsequent events 
cause a significant imbalance between power supply and load, and move power systems 
into a restorative state. Frequency instability, voltage instability and rotor angle 
instability can take place during system restoration, leading to an uncontrolled system 
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splitting. The excessive imbalance between load and generation after the uncontrolled 
system splitting eventually leads to a large-scale blackout. 
Initiating events in this context include: natural calamities, power system 
component failures, protection and control system malfunctions, information and 
communication system failures, system instability due to disturbances, human errors, 
inadequate security assessment procedures, gaming in the electricity market, sabotages, 
intrusions by external agents, and missing or uncertain information in decision making 
[7]. 
Common emergency states include overloading and over-excitation. These 
vulnerable operating conditions can trigger corresponding relay actions such as line 
tripping due to overloading, and generator tripping due to over-excitation. The relay 
actions may further weaken power systems, and result in subsequent events. For example, 
tripping of an overloaded line leads to a power flow rerouting, and then the remaining 
lines have to deliver more power, which may cause overloading in the transmission 
network, and hence successive line tripping events. 
Restorative states include loss of synchronism, and abnormal system voltage and 
frequency. In a restorative state, load and generator tripping events spread promptly, 
which may initiate an uncontrolled system splitting. 
1.2 Countermeasures 
Much effort has been made to improve the reliability of power systems against 
cascaded events. Current research is focused on three areas: preventive mechanisms, 
emergency controls, and restorative controls, as shown in Fig. 1.2. 
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Preventive mechanisms are to mitigate the impact of initiating events on power 
systems. If one wants to develop the preventive mechanism against a given class of 
initiating events for power systems, the probability of occurrence of every initiating event 
should be evaluated, the resultant impact should be assessed quantitatively, and then 
mitigation mechanisms can be proposed based on a cost-effectiveness analysis. In [8], the 
impact of a massive measurement loss on power system state estimation is evaluated. The 
results suggest that the inclusion of injection pseudo measurement provides a stable state 
estimation with acceptable errors. In [9], lightning-related failure rate of power system 
equipment is evaluated by a formalized method. Insulation coordination of power system 
equipment is suggested consequently. In [10], animal-caused faults in power distribution 
systems are discussed and analyzed. An effective method to prevent such faults is 
presented. 
Normal Emergency Restorative
Subsequent 
events
Uncontrolled system 
splitting
Large-scale 
blackout
Initiating 
events
Preventive 
mechanisms
Emergency 
controls
Restorative 
controls  
Fig.  1.2.   The countermeasures against cascaded events 
Emergency controls are employed to prevent power systems from entering 
restorative states. Emergency controls typically involve monitoring of power systems in 
real time (especially power system dynamics), coordinated relay actions, and corrective 
control actions. In [11], voltage stability of a power system is monitored in real time by 
an artificial neural network based method. Voltage stability margin is calculated in real 
time based on wide-area measurements. Voltage stability control actions are initiated 
according to the estimated voltage stability margin. In [12], power system stability is 
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evaluated after a disturbance, so as to identify whether or not power systems will return 
to a stable operating point. A system protection scheme is proposed to bring an unstable 
operating point back inside a stable region in order to avoid cascaded voltage collapses. 
In [13], transient stability is assessed in real time by monitoring generator angles and 
angular speeds. In [14], frequency stability after a contingency is predicted by a novel 
predictive method. Stabilizing load shedding is determined in a coordinated way. 
Restorative controls are used to stop the propagation of power system instability, 
in order to prevent a widespread blackout. Typical restorative control actions include 
generator output adjustment, controlled generator tripping, load shedding, and system 
islanding. Reference [15] proposes a self-healing system reconfiguration method that 
intentionally splits a power network under a contingency into self-sufficient islands to 
avoid catastrophic failures. 
1.3 Research Scope 
This work contributes to the development of new emergency control methods and 
preventive mechanisms. 
First, a new emergency control scheme is proposed for preventing power systems 
from entering one of the severe operating conditions: loss of synchronism. Rotor angle 
stability of power systems has been a challenging task as the dynamics of power systems 
become more and more complex. Traditional out-of-step relays predict a loss of 
synchronism in the first power swing after clearance of disturbances. Nevertheless, 
severe disturbances such as double faults along both circuits of double-circuit lines might 
cause a loss of synchronism in swings after the first swing. As a result, rotor angle 
stability cannot be easily predicted. However, the advent of the Phasor Measurement 
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Units (PMUs), together with advances in computational and communications facilities, 
provides an opportunity to perform on-line monitoring of power system dynamics. This 
research proposes a PMU-based application for on-line monitoring of rotor angle stability. 
Then, a preventive mechanism against cyber attacks is developed. Power systems 
are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Modern IT technologies are heavily used in today’s 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of industrial control 
systems including power systems. While IT technologies bring a lot of benefits, many 
security risks are introduced as well. For example, the connectivity of SCADA systems 
and enterprise networks improves business visibility and efficiency, but it makes SCADA 
systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. According to the 2003-2006 data from Eric 
Byres, BCIT, 49% cyber attacks at industrial control systems are launched via the 
connected enterprise networks. One highly publicized example is Stuxnet, which attacked 
an industrial control system by infecting those organization networks that interact with 
the target [16]. This work proposes a systematic method for risk assessment to address 
issues arising from cyber threats. 
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CHAPTER 2. PMU-BASED MONITORING OF ROTOR ANGLE 
STABILITY 
2.1 State-of-the-art 
The first version of a PMU-based out-of-step relay is applied to the Florida-
Georgia system in [17]-[20]. The system is modeled as two interconnected equivalent 
generators. Then two PMU sets are used to monitor the angular difference between these 
two equivalent generators. Based on the monitored angular difference, the Equal Area 
Criterion (EAC) is utilized to distinguish between an unstable power swing and a stable 
one. In [21], the Energy Function Analysis is used to monitor rotor angle stability. 
Reference [22] reports an out-of-step prediction logic based on an autoregressive model 
(AR model). A method for monitoring an inter-area oscillation mode by spectrum 
analysis is presented in [23]. The results of [22-23] represent forecasting procedures 
based on time-series analysis of PMU data during power swings. In [24], synchronized 
phasor measurements are used as the input for the computation of the 
differential/algebraic equation (DAE) model of post-fault power systems. Then, the 
numerical results are used for prediction. A fuzzy neural network based on PMUs is 
applied to power swing stability prediction [25]. In [26], a self-adaptive Decision Tree 
(DT) approach for on-line dynamic security assessment is presented. Offline contingency 
analysis data such as PMU data is used to identify critical attributes of DT nodes and to 
train DT. In [27], large-size DTs extracting selected decision features from PMU 
measurements are used for rapid stability assessment. The technique involves an off-line 
study. In [28], neural networks are used to estimate rotor angles for on-line monitoring of 
transient stability based on PMU measurements. 
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In this work, an analytical method is proposed for monitoring wide-area rotor 
angle stability in an operational environment using PMU data. Power systems are 
modeled as a multi-bus system. The Maximal Lyapunov Exponent (MLE) is employed to 
determine whether or not a power swing indicates a loss of synchronism. The method 
provides a high level of accuracy with a low computational burden. 
The application of the Lyapunov Exponents is proposed in [29]. Their work 
indicates that the Lyapunov Exponents can be used to predict out-of-step conditions. The 
result is supported by simulation results with a small power system. The proposed 
method in this research extends the work of [29] by articulating the mathematical 
relationship between the Lyapunov Exponents and loss of synchronism conditions. 
Furthermore, the connection between MLE and rotor angle stability of power systems is 
established. An efficient computational algorithm is proposed for the calculation of MLE 
based on a finite time window of PMU data. The effectiveness of the proposed method is 
validated by simulation results with a 3-bus system and a 200-bus system. 
2.2 Problem Formulation 
Rotor angle stability is concerned with the ability of power systems to maintain 
synchronism when subjected to a small or large disturbance. Power system faults and line 
switching result in a sudden change on generator outputs. However, mechanical power 
inputs to generators do not change instantaneously. These major disturbances can cause 
severe oscillations in machine rotor angles and severe swings in power flows. A loss of 
synchronism can occur between one generator and the rest of the system, or between 
groups of generators, leading to instability conditions. This research is concerned with the 
prediction of rotor angle instability following disturbances on power systems. The goal of 
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this research is to develop a practical application of PMU data together with 
mathematical and computational foundations. 
A power system with n buses and m+1 generators represented by a dynamical 
model is considered. The generators are modeled by classical equations, while the loads 
are represented by ZIP models. Assume that mechanical power inputs to the generators 
are constant during a contingency period. The system model can be represented by: 
{
   
 
  
   
 
   
 
  
     
     
                                                    (2.1) 
where i=1,2,…,m,        
      
   ,       
      
   ,   
  is the relative rotor 
angle of generator i,   
  is the relative angular speed of generator i, and    is a nonlinear 
function of   and . 
Prior to a disturbance, the power system is represented by a 2m-dimensional 
continuous-time dynamical system denoted by: 
  
  
                                                                  (2.2) 
where      
      
    
      
   .    represents the vector of nonlinear functions of 
the dynamical system that represents the power system in a pre-disturbance steady state. 
After a disturbance, parameters of the model are updated as necessary in order to 
establish a nonlinear dynamical system to represent the power system during the 
contingency period. 
  
  
                                                                  (2.3) 
where     represents the vector of nonlinear functions of the dynamical system that 
represents the power system during the contingency period. The nonlinear system 
trajectory        in the state space is the power swing curve following the disturbance. 
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The nonlinear system is said to be stable if and only if        approaches an 
asymptotically stable equilibrium point, which means        arrives at, and stays within 
the attractor of an asymptotically stable equilibrium point. The generators maintain 
synchronism if the nonlinear system is asymptotically stable. The proposed method in 
this work is used to assess nonlinear system stability, and hence rotor angle stability. 
Assessing local stability by linearizing around an equilibrium point is a special case of 
the method. 
Note that        represents a post-fault system trajectory. The brief fault-on 
period from the occurrence of a fault to relay tripping, breaker opening (and possible 
breaker reclosure) is not explicitly modeled. The fault-on period will affect system states 
and hence initial conditions of the post-fault period. The proposed method is intended for 
monitoring of the electromechanical dynamics of power systems from the initial 
condition of the post-fault period. 
2.3 Methodology: Lyapunov Exponents 
MLE of        is calculated to monitor rotor angle stability after a disturbance. If 
MLE is negative, it is concluded that        will approach an asymptotically stable 
equilibrium point, and hence the power swing is (asymptotically) stable. For the proposed 
method, if MLE is higher than or equal to zero, it is judged that        will not approach 
any asymptotically stable equilibrium point, and the power swing is considered 
“unstable”, which, strictly speaking, means “not asymptotically stable” in this context of 
this work. 
The Lyapunov Exponents and their relationship with system stability are 
discussed in the following. In ergodic theory of dynamical systems, the Lyapunov 
10 
 
Exponents are used to characterize the exponential divergence or convergence of nearby 
trajectories as shown in Fig. 2.1. For an N-dimensional continuous-time dynamical 
system 
  
  
     , let             be the solution at time t starting from the initial 
condition     . The Lyapunov Exponents    for i=1,…,N are defined as eigenvalues of 
the following limiting. 
             
                 
          ̅     
                                       (2.4) 
where                            ,  
       is the transpose of       , and  ̅     
is the ith eigenvalue of     . 
( )tx
( )tx
0x
0x
 
Fig.  2.1.   Nearby trajectories in the state space 
The limit in (2.4) is known to exist by Oseledec multiplicative ergodic theorem 
[30]. For the purpose of the proposed application, the following index is defined. 
          
    ‖        ‖                                           (2.5) 
where        is a randomly chosen vector in small scale, as shown in Fig. 2.1.   in 
(2.5) is MLE. A negative (positive) value of   implies the exponential convergence 
(divergence, respectively) of nearby system trajectories. This is true due to the 
approximation of 
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‖     ‖     ‖   ‖                                                 (2.6) 
In this research, the relationship between MLE and asymptotic behavior of a 
dynamical system is established based on the results of [31]. 
MLE Stability Criterion: Consider a continuous-time dynamical system and 
assume that all the Lyapunov exponents are nonzero. Then the steady state behavior of 
the system consists of a fixed point. Furthermore, if MLE is negative, then the steady 
state behavior is an attracting fixed point. 
Outline of Proof: Consider a N-dimensional continuous-time dynamical system 
  
  
     ,   is differentiable, and       , where   is a compact set. If the initial 
point      is given, then there is a corresponding trajectory      in the N-dimensional 
phase space. There also exist N Lyapunov Exponents for      according to the definition 
of the Lyapunov Exponents. 
Definition 2.1 [32]. The equilibrium point     is 
 Stable if, for each    , there is          such that 
‖        ‖    ‖        ‖         
 asymptotically stable if it is stable and   can be chosen, such that 
‖        ‖       
   
‖        ‖    
Now define 
  
  
      with an arbitrary initial point     . Then there is another 
trajectory      in the state space. According to the definition of the Lyapunov Exponents, 
if MLE of     ,    ,      , such that 
‖         ‖        
   
‖         ‖    
Hence, the separation between the trajectories     and      will diminish to 0 as time 
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goes on, if     and the initial points      and      are close enough, as Fig. 2.2 shows. 
( )tx
(0)x
1
( )ty
( ) ( )t ty x
(0) (0)y x
(0)y
 
Fig.  2.2.   The diminishing separation 
If    , as mentioned before,      , such that 
‖         ‖        
   
‖         ‖    
Then      , such that ‖          ‖    . Let           , then          
   , since the dynamical system is autonomous, as Fig 2.3 shows. 
( )tx
( ) ( )t t T  y x
(0) ( )T y x
(0)x
T
1
 
Fig.  2.3.   The colliding trajectories 
Hence 
   
   
‖         ‖     
   
‖            ‖    
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Moreover 
   
   
‖            ‖     
   
‖         ‖ 
Since     , 
   
   
‖       ‖    
Therefore,      will approach an equilibrium point, say    .  
    can be viewed as a special trajectory: it starts at    , stays at    . The special 
trajectory of     has the same MLE as      does. Then      , such that 
‖        ‖        
   
‖        ‖    
Hence, by Definition 2.1,     is asymptotically stable. 
MLE stability criterion provides a sufficient condition for system stability when 
MLE is negative. If λ is positive or zero, nearby system trajectories will not converge 
according to (2.6). Suppose that the system trajectory      has arrived at an equilibrium 
point    , and    . Assume that a small disturbance is applied, state variables move to 
another point near    . A new system trajectory will start at that point around    . Since 
   , the new trajectory will not get back to    . System instability is likely to occur. 
The probability cannot be measured accurately due to the chaotic nature of nonlinear 
systems. However, study shows that system instability occurs within practical systems 
when λ is positive or zero. 
2.4 On-line Monitoring Scheme 
The concept for on-line monitoring of rotor angle stability is illustrated in Fig. 
2.4. It is intended to be an application in the control center of a power system. The 
proposed algorithm obtains updated power network configurations from the State 
14 
 
Estimator (SE), say, every 5 minutes. 
PMU
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GPS Satellite
Communication Links
...
Data Concentrator
State Estimator
Application Servers
Real-Time Data
Server
Ethernet
Proposed Algorithm
Control Center
 
Fig.  2.4.   The concept for monitoring of rotor angle stability 
As discussed in Section 2.2, following a disturbance such as a fault and the 
corresponding relay and breaker responses, the sudden change of power network 
configurations is reported through SCADA systems in real time. There is a time delay 
before SCADA data arrives at the control center. Typically, the control center will 
receive SCADA data about the configuration change in a matter of seconds. For example, 
in California ISO, the transmission delay is less than 4 seconds. An updated post-fault 
dynamic model  ̇         is then obtained by modifying related parameters according to 
SCADA data. After that, the proposed algorithm extracts synchronized phasor 
measurements from the PMU data concentrator, which obtains real time PMU data from 
substations equipped with PMUs. Hence, a number of the variables of        are 
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observed from PMU data. Based on the updated dynamical system and PMU 
measurements after the disturbance, MLE index of        is calculated by the algorithm 
which will be discussed in detail next. If MLE has a negative value, the prediction is that 
the power swing is stable; otherwise, it is unstable. Appropriate control actions will be 
needed. 
If another disturbance occurs during the computation of MLE, and it changes the 
system configurations, the power system will be represented by another updated 
dynamical system consequently, and system stability will be re-assessed. MLE will be re-
calculated based on the most current dynamical system model and PMU measurements 
after the event, in order to determine system stability. 
2.5 Computation Method 
A computationally efficient algorithm to calculate MLE is proposed. The 
calculation of MLE is based on (2.5). In practice, there are three difficulties:  
1) One can only calculate     , MLE over a finite time interval T, instead of 
  over an infinite time interval as shown in (2.5). The length of time 
interval, T should be preselected properly so that      is able to predict 
short-term system stability and instability. 
2) Complete observability of the trajectory        is required in (2.5) to 
calculate its MLE, which means that rotor angles and angular speeds of all 
the generators in a power system are to be observed by PMU data. 
However, at present, there are only a limited number of PMUs in power 
systems.  
3) A fast way to calculate MLE is required for on-line monitoring, since rotor 
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angle stability after a disturbance must be determined quickly to allow for 
effective control actions.  
The above issues are addressed in the following. 
2.5.1 Spectrum Analysis 
Spectrum analysis is used to compute an appropriate time interval length T. In 
practice, power swings exhibit strong periodic behaviors, and the frequency lies within a 
narrow frequency band under a given system scenario. One can simulate all the credible 
disturbances on a power system in an off-line study, and obtain power swing curves 
following the disturbances. Spectrum analysis is then applied to the power swing curves 
to identify a frequency band. In this work, the R language is employed to conduct the 
spectrum analysis. Based on results of the spectrum analysis, T is set as the inverse ratio 
to the lower limit of the frequency band, so that it covers at least one cycle of the power 
swings.      has the capability to predict whether rotor angle instability will occur in 
swings after the first power swing. 
2.5.2 Implicit Integration Method With Trapezoidal Rule 
The Implicit Integration Method With Trapezoidal Rule is used to approximate 
the unobservable part of the state variables in       . The idea is to estimate the 
unobservable state variables at instant j+1 based on the estimated values of the 
unobservable state variables at instant j and the observed values of the observable state 
variables at instant j and j+1. For example, assume that the state variables           are 
monitored by PMUs, while the remaining variables are not. The state variables of        
are either observed or estimated. The unobservable state variables of         are 
estimated by integration results of the dynamical system 
  
  
       , shown as follows:  
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               {                        }      
         
     
 
         
     
                   (2.7) 
where    is a predefined time step, and   
      is the observed value of        at instant 
   by PMU data. The Newton-Raphson method is then applied to calculate an estimation 
of        . Note that for the next time increments,         ,         , … , can be 
approximated by the same procedure. 
The Newton-Raphson method requires matrix inversion operations. 
Correspondingly, computational burden can be high when a large number of state 
variables are not observable in (2.7). However, it is noted that the matrices that need to be 
inversed here are the Jacobian matrix of                        , which equals to 
                   (            is the time-varying Jacobian matrix of        along 
with the trajectory       ). It is diagonally dominant when    is small. Note that by 
simplifying the matrices as diagonal, the computational burden is dramatically reduced 
without compromising the accuracy. 
2.5.3 Gram-Schmidt Reorthonormalization (GSR) 
(0)Trx
(2 )Tr tx
( )Tr tx
(3 )Tr tx
( )Tr tx
(0)z
(1)z
(2)z
(3)z
ˆ(0)z
ˆ(1)z
ˆ(2)z ˆ(3)z
0 ( )d tx
1 ( )d tx
2 ( )d tx
3 ( )d tx
 
Fig.  2.5.   The standard method with GSR 
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The standard method with GSR [33] is used to calculate      after the estimation 
of       . The method is based on (2.6), from which one can obtain 
        ‖     ‖  ‖   ‖                                            (2.8) 
The algorithm proceeds as follows: 
1) Let                ,    , and        . 
2) Do the following while        
a. Assume that there is another trajectory   
     of the dynamical 
system 
  
  
        with a different initial point than       . The 
separation of the two trajectories is      at      . Then 
  
                     at      , as shown in Fig. 2.5. 
Compute the separation  ̂    at          . 
 ̂      
                        {                 }       (2.9) 
b. Compute the rate of the separation      at that moment. 
        ‖ ̂   ‖ ‖    ‖                                   (2.10) 
c. Compute the time average of the rate of the separation by      
    . 
     
[                ]
         
                                  (2.11) 
d. Reorthonormalize the separation, so that        has the same 
direction that  ̂    does, while the magnitude of        equals to 
1, as shown in Fig. 2.5. 
        ̂   ‖    ‖ ‖ ̂   ‖                     (2.12) 
e.       
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3) When         , the time average of the rate of the separation by 
       equals to     , so       
     . 
2.6 Simulation Results 
A 3-machine system and a 200-bus system are used for the validation of the 
proposed method. 
2.6.1 3-machine System 
For illustration of the computational techniques, a simple 3-machine system with 
lossless transmission lines is used, as shown in Fig. 2.6. Classical swing equations are 
given as follows: 
       ̈     ̇                                         
       ̈     ̇                                         
       ̈     ̇                                         
   (2.13) 
M 1 M 2
M 3
1 1E  2 2E 
3 3E 
12X
13X 23X
 
Fig.  2.6.   A 3-machine system 
In the simulations, it is assumed that          ,          ,       
   ,                   ,            ,                    ,      
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                              . A 6-dimensional dynamical system is 
obtained: 
 ̇    
 ̇                                              
 ̇    
 ̇                                              
 ̇    
 ̇                                           
          (2.14) 
Assume that                    A 3-phase fault followed by a normal 
clearing is applied to each transmission line respectively. The fault is cleared by relay and 
breaker operations, which will last for a fraction of a second. Then it is assumed that the 
breaker recloses successfully at 1s. During the fault clearing period, one parameter of the 
dynamical system in (2.14) is changed since one branch is de-energized. Then the 
parameter will change back to the original value if the break recloses and it is successful. 
Assume that there is one PMU at every generator bus; it is desirable to monitor 
the real-time values of the state variables in (2.14). The time-varying Jacobian matrix of 
(2.14) is obtained. Let         ,     .      is calculated by the standard method 
with GSR.      and time-domain simulation results are shown in Table 2.1. As it shows, 
     predicts losses of synchronism correctly. 
Table  2.1.   The simulation results of the 3-machine system 
3-phase fault Clearing Time-domain simulation result      
Branch 1-2 Branch 1-2 stable -0.0869 
Branch 2-3 Branch 2-3 unstable 0.3139 
Branch 1-3 Branch 1-3 unstable 0.7823 
Note that in the third contingency in Table 2.1, the power swing may appear to be 
stable based on the observations during the first 3 seconds, but it turns out to be unstable 
later, as shown in Fig. 2.7.      predicts the instability correctly. 
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Fig.  2.7.   The time-domain simulation result for the 3rd contingency 
2.6.2 200-bus System 
A 200-bus system that resembles the structure of WECC power grid, as shown in 
Fig. 2.8, is used for testing of the monitoring algorithm. The model has 31 generators and 
8 of them are observable by PMU data. The power system is simulated with PSS/E 
software tool. Each synchronous machine is modeled as a round-rotor generator and each 
load is represented by shunt admittance at its bus. The proposed algorithm is 
implemented in Matlab. It processes the data generated by PSS/E and calculates MLE. 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) disturbance class B 
given in NERC Planning Standards is considered. Here it is condensed to a 3-phase fault 
for 0.07s with clearing of the related generator or transmission circuit.  
Spectrum analysis is performed in off-line study to determine an appropriate time 
interval for MLE. Time-domain simulations are carried out after NERC disturbance class 
B. Then spectrum analysis is performed on the resultant power swing curves. It shows 
that the power swing curves oscillate within 0.2-1.0 Hz. Therefore, T is set as 5s.      is 
to be calculated to determine angle stability after disturbances. 
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A 62-dimensional dynamical system model is established to represent the 200-bus 
system, as shown in Section 2.2. After a disturbance, related parameters of the dynamical 
system are changed accordingly. 16 state variables of the dynamical system are observed 
during the contingency period, since only 8 out of 31 generators are observable by PMU 
data. The other state variables are estimated by the Implicit Integration Method With 
Trapezoidal Rule, as described in Section 2.5. The approximation results are very close to 
time-domain simulation results. For example, the relative rotor angle and relative angular 
speed of the generator at bus 79 after several disturbances are shown in Fig. 2.9. Bus 79 
is at the upper left corner of Fig. 2.8, indicated by an oval. 
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Fig.  2.8.   A 200-bus system 
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After the generator at bus 18 (circled on the right side of Fig. 2.8) is disconnected 
due to a fault at bus 18, the relative rotor angle and relative angular speed of the generator 
at bus 79 oscillate dramatically, as Fig. 2.9(a) and (b) show. The approximation results of 
the angle and relative angular speed coincide with the time-domain simulation results 
very well. After line 104-102 (marked on the left side of Fig. 2.8) is disconnected, the 
relative rotor angle and relative angular speed of the generator at bus 79 remain stable, as 
indicated in Fig. 2.9(c) and (d). The approximation results are reasonable, since the trends 
of the approximation results coincide well with the time-domain simulation results. 
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Fig.  2.9.   The time-domain simulation results and the approximation results for 
comparison 
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The index      is calculated by the standard method with GSR, with all the state 
variables either observed or estimated. Mechanical power inputs to generators are 
assumed to keep constant during the calculation of     . It is practical because primary 
controls of generators will not act to change mechanical power inputs until a frequency 
variation is detected. A detectable frequency variation occurs in swings after the first 
swing. The calculation of      will be finished before primary controls act. If primary 
controls do act at some point, system stability will be reassessed.      will be 
recalculated based on an updated dynamical model. 
Table  2.2.   The simulation results of the 200-bus system 
3-phase fault Clearing Time-domain simulation result      
Bus 18 Generator 18 unstable 0.2958 
Bus 30 Generator 30 unstable 0.1421 
Bus 35 Generator 35 unstable 0.1559 
Bus 36 Generator 36 unstable 0.4526 
Bus 40 Generator 40 stable -0.1588 
Bus 43 Generator 43 stable -0.0964 
Bus 45 Generator 45 unstable 0.4102 
Bus 47 Generator 47 stable -0.0816 
Bus 65 Generator 65 unstable 0.1164 
Bus 70 Generator 70 unstable 0.1065 
Bus 32 Line 32-31 unstable 0.2782 
Bus 64 Line 64-142 stable -0.1049 
Bus 74 Line 74-78 unstable 0.4460 
Bus 83 Line 83-168 stable -0.0434 
Bus 104 Line 104-102 stable -0.3635 
Bus 108 Line 108-174 stable -0.3144 
Bus 114 Line 114-171 stable -0.1026 
Bus 119 Line 119-131 stable -0.1919 
Bus 122 Line 122-123 stable -0.2977 
Bus 145 Line 145-151 stable -0.3150 
     and time-domain simulation results for some disturbances are shown in 
Table 2.2. As shown in the table,      is positive when power swings are unstable after 
fault clearing;      is negative when power swings are stable. 
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It is noted that, when the disturbance is generator tripping, the power swing is 
more likely to be unstable, as Fig. 2.9(a) and (b) show. On the other hand, when the 
disturbance of line tripping is applied to the power system, the power swing tends to be 
stable, as illustrated in Fig. 2.9(c) and (d). 
Although the unstable cases shown in Table 2.2 are related to the separation of a 
generator due to a 3-phase bus fault, the 200-bus system, which has a simplified 
configuration that resembles WECC system, can exhibit complex instability phenomena 
beyond what is shown by the simulation cases in the research. For example, system 
oscillations occur after an initiating tree contact with a 500-kV line and the following 
generator tripping events [34]. 
2.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table  2.3.   The sensitivity analysis results 
3-phase 
fault 
Clearing 
Time-domain 
simulation 
result 
                               
Bus 116 Generator 116 unstable -0.0682 0.1751 0.1368 0.1745 0.1978 0.1748 
Bus 138 Generator 138 unstable 0.2119 0.4644 0.4519 0.3234 0.3362 0.1785 
Bus 144 Generator 144 unstable -0.1635 0.1416 0.2172 0.1501 0.1016 0.0778 
Bus 149 Generator 149 unstable 0.0620 0.1209 0.2045 0.2679 0.4402 0.4350 
Bus 198 Generator 198 unstable 0.2190 0.4344 0.3983 0.2815 0.3320 0.2537 
Bus 58 Line 41-58 stable -0.2327 -0.2199 -0.2066 -0.1890 -0.1545 -0.0220 
Bus 142 Line 142-151 stable -0.2387 -0.2242 -0.2090 -0.1839 -0.1265 -0.1514 
Bus 132 Line 132-133 stable -0.2324 -0.2180 -0.2011 -0.1636 -0.1174 -0.0830 
Bus 182 Line 181-182 stable -0.1450 -0.1401 -0.1353 -0.1306 -0.1255 -0.0862 
Bus 155 Line 155-165 stable -0.1336 -0.1293 -0.1250 -0.1210 -0.1171 -0.1060 
A sensitivity analysis with respect to the time interval length T is performed, in 
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order to quantify its impact on the accuracy of the proposed method. Following a 
disturbance on the 200-bus system, MLE is calculated over different time windows. Part 
of the computation results are shown in Table 2.3.  
The following facts are observed: 
1) As the value of T increases, MLE predicts system stability with a higher 
level of accuracy. For example,      fails to detect instability after the first 
and third disturbances. MLE calculated over a longer time window 
provides a correct prediction. 
2) The value of MLE varies after different disturbances. It is reasonable 
because different disturbances change power system configurations in 
different ways, as shown in Table 2.3. Consequently, MLE is calculated 
based on different dynamical system configurations.  
3) When the system is unstable, the value of MLE changes with respect to 
the time interval length T in a pattern that exhibits varying characteristics. 
This is the case because MLE is calculated based on a nonlinear system 
trajectory within one time window. When the nonlinear system is unstable, 
small changes in the time window length T can cause the value of MLE to 
vary significantly. 
4) When the system is stable, the value of MLE is negative but tends to 
increase as the window size increases, as shown in Table 2.3. The 
observation seems to indicate that the system is considered less stable 
when a larger set of observations are obtained by a wider time window. 
For a power system undergoing a contingency, it is reasonable that more 
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variations are observed within a larger time frame. 
2.6.4 Computational Burden 
The total computational burden of the proposed algorithm is affordable for on-line 
applications. Consider a power system with    generators,    of which are not observed 
by PMU data. If         ,     , and the Newton-Raphson method iterates 20 times 
at most, the main computational burden would be         
                
multiplication operations and        
                addition operations. Taking 
the 200-bus system in Subsection 2.6.2 as an example; it takes 0.0044 sec to calculate 
     for a 3 GHz Pentium 4 CPU. Moreover, the proposed algorithm is recursive. It does 
not have to obtain all the PMU data needed before calculating MLE. For example, if      
is to be calculated, and PMUs transmit 1-sec time window data every time, the algorithm 
can start calculating once the first 1-sec time window data is obtained, and wait for the 
next one from PMUs at the same time. 
2.7 Discussion 
A PMU-based method for on-line dynamic security assessment has been 
developed. The main idea is to calculate MLE in order to predict a loss of synchronism. 
The proposed MLE method is based on a solid analytical foundation, and it is 
computationally efficient. 
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CHAPTER 3. RISK ASSESSMENT FOR CYBER SECURITY 
3.1 State-of-the-art 
In 2006, US Department of Energy (DOE) published “Roadmap to secure control 
systems in the energy sector” (updated in 2011) [35]. It envisions that: in 10 years, 
control systems for critical applications will be designed, installed, operated, and 
maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of any critical function. 
Much effort has been made to secure the facilities. The DOE National SCADA Test Bed 
(NSTB) Program, established in 2003, supports industry and government efforts to 
enhance cyber security of control systems in the energy sector. The NERC standards CIP-
002-4 through CIP-009-4 provide a cyber security framework for the identification and 
protection of critical cyber assets to support reliable operations of the bulk electric system 
[36]. The International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Council (IEC TC 57), 
i.e., power system management and associated information exchange, has advanced the 
standard communication protocol security in IEC62351 with stronger encryption and 
authentication mechanisms [37]. The Hallmark Project by Schweitzer Engineering 
Laboratories, Inc. presents the Secure SCADA Communications Protocol (SSCP) 
technology which provides integrity for SCADA messages. United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) has set up awareness programs about system 
vulnerabilities to improve control system security [38]. The Cyber Security Audit and 
Attack Detection Toolkit by Digital Bond, Inc. is developed to identify vulnerable 
configurations in control system devices and applications. Reference [39] presents a risk 
assessment methodology that accounts for both physical and cyber security of critical 
infrastructures. In [40], a SCADA security framework is proposed. System vulnerabilities 
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are assessed quantitatively through an attack tree. The impact of a cyber attack on 
SCADA systems is studied systematically in [41]. It is evaluated by the resultant loss of 
load through a power flow computation. 
This research presents a new risk assessment framework for SCADA systems of 
power grids. Individual vulnerabilities within control systems are evaluated based on the 
Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method (DERFEM). An attack graph is 
developed to identify possible intrusion scenarios that exploit multiple security 
vulnerabilities. An Intrusion Response System (IRS) based on PMU data is proposed to 
assess the impact of intrusion scenarios on power system dynamics. 
The main contribution is IRS, which is an on-line monitoring and control scheme 
based on PMUs. It monitors the impact of cyber intrusions on power system dynamics in 
real time. If power system instability such as voltage instability is judged to be likely 
after a cyber attack, IRS will act as a mitigation mechanism to prevent power system 
instability. Unlike traditional security mechanisms such as encryption and authentication, 
which increase the complexity of power systems, and may cost additional time in power 
system operations, IRS uses a control strategy based on the Conditional Lyapunov 
Exponents (CLEs) to enhance the resilience of power systems against cyber attacks. 
3.2 Risk Assessment Framework 
The risk assessment framework is shown in Fig. 3.1. For SCADA systems of a 
power system, the procedure starts with identification of the configuration of its cyber 
system. The vulnerabilities within the cyber system are then identified. Each vulnerability 
is evaluated quantitatively by DERFEM. An attack graph is built to identify possible 
intrusion scenarios that exploit multiple vulnerabilities. The probability of occurrence of 
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every intrusion scenario is calculated. Once an intrusion scenario is successfully 
executed, IRS will monitor its impact on power system dynamics in real time. The impact 
is characterized by CLEs computed on PMU data. If values of CLEs are high, it is judged 
that voltage instability is likely to happen. Control actions based on CLEs will be taken to 
prevent voltage instability. 
Identify the configuration of the cyber system
CLEsControl actions
End
High
Low
Identify the security vulnerabilities
Formulate an attack graph to 
identify intrusion scenarios
Evaluate each vulnerability by 
DERFEM
Monitor the impact of intrusion scenarios on power 
system dynamics through IRS
Compute the probability of occurrence of every 
intrusion scenario
 
Fig.  3.1.   The proposed risk assessment framework 
3.2.1 Duality Element Relative Fuzzy Evaluation Method 
Suppose that a cyber system has n identified vulnerabilities:   ,   , … ,    . 
DERFEM is employed to assign each vulnerability a scaled value within [0, 1] which 
quantitatively characterizes the vulnerable level. The larger the scaled value is; the higher 
the vulnerable level will be. 
DERFEM proceeds as follows: 
1) Compare a pair of different vulnerabilities (  ,   ) so as to obtain the scaled 
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values           and          .           represents the vulnerable 
level of    compared to   . Likewise,           represents the vulnerable 
level of    compared to   .              ;              . If 
                   , it implies that the vulnerability    has a higher 
vulnerable level than    does. 
2) Continue the comparison of different pairs of individual vulnerabilities 
until a matrix such as Table 3.1 is generated (          is set to be 1 here 
for convenience of the calculation). 
3) In each row of Table 3.1, substitute           with           , where 
                                             . 
4) Finally, the vulnerable level of    is quantitatively characterized by 
       ;                                                . 
Table  3.1.   The comparison results of the vulnerabilities 
          …    
   1                     …           
             1           …           
                       1 …           
            
                                 … 1 
DERFEM does not measure the vulnerable level of vulnerability directly, which 
could be difficult. It reveals the relatively vulnerable level of the vulnerability compared 
to the others. 
3.2.2 Attack Graph 
In practice, a hacker may have to compromise a couple of interconnected hosts 
within a cyber system before he/she gains access to the control systems. For example, an 
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outside intruder has to compromise an enterprise network, and then attack the connected 
industrial control systems via the enterprise network. This procedure is modeled as an 
intrusion scenario in this research. An intrusion scenario is comprised of several intrusion 
actions; each action involves exploiting one security vulnerability. 
An attack graph is employed to capture possible intrusion scenarios within a cyber 
system. The attack graph depicts ways in which a hacker compromises the interconnected 
hosts sequentially by exploiting the corresponding vulnerabilities so as to achieve a 
specific goal. The benefits of the attack graph takes into account the effects of 
interactions of local vulnerabilities and find global security holes introduced by the 
interconnections [42]. 
The basic concepts of the attack graph are defined as follows. 
Definition 3.1: Subject (ST). Subject is the initiator of actions.       can be an 
attacker or a compromised device. 
Definition 3.2: Node (ND). An electronic device in a cyber system is a node, 
using               to denote. id is the identifier of the node, and it could be set as 
an equipment name. If a node is compromised by a subject, the node itself will become a 
subject. 
Definition 3.3: Privilege (PG). It is used to describe the operating privilege of a 
subject in a node. When       and      , the function           {           } 
expresses the privilege level of st in nd.   (       )    implies that Subject     has no 
access to Node    ;   (       )    indicates that Subject     is able to read the 
inbound and outbound messages of Node    ;   (       )    means that Subject     is 
able to block the inbound and outbound messages of Node    ;   (       )    
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represents that Subject     can read and block the inbound and outbound messages of 
Node    ;   (       )    denotes that Subject     can send messages to Node    ; 
  (       )    signifies that Subject     has the full control access to Node    . 
Definition 3.4: State (Z). State is a triple                    . State is the 
prerequisite of the next attack action to be implemented. 
Definition 3.5: Interconnection (IC). Interconnection refers to connections 
between nodes, using a quadruplet                       ,      ,            to 
denote.      represents the communication channel between     and    .      could be 
copper wires, optical fibers, wireless, Dial-up, Virtual Private Network (VPN), or digital 
microwave.      is the type of the messages from     to    .      could be 
measurements or control signals.     does not necessarily equal to    . 
Definition 3.6: Action (A). Action represents the set of possible actions of the 
subjects in a cyber system. Action is a quadruplet                 ,    ,       
 . name is the name of the attack action such as the Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack and 
the man-in-the-middle attack;    and    represent the initial state and final state of the 
action; r is the vulnerability exploited in the action. r is used to denote the difficult level 
of Action a. 
The algorithm to construct an attack graph proceeds as follows: 
1) Identify ND and IC. Develop a directed graph (ND, IC). The vertex is 
     , and the edge is      . 
2) Identify the nodes      which will be the targets of attacks.      could be 
a SCADA server or a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). 
3) Determine the goals of attacks − the state of      after being attacked, 
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formulated as follows:    [           (        )   ] , where     
represents the initial intruding subject (hackers). 
4) Traverse the directed graph (ND, IC). Identify the nodes     
 that are 
connected to      directly. Assume that Node     
  has been compromised 
by    , and it becomes an intruding subject, say     
 . 
5) Extract an attack action aimed at      from     
 , such that   
               ,    [    
         (    
      )    (        )] .    is 
the vulnerability of Node      exploited in Action a. 
6) Establish the prerequisite of Action a:   , formulated as follows:    
[        
    (        
 )   ]. 
7) Set     
  as a new target node, and    becomes another   . Repeat Step 4, 
5 and 6, until     
     . 
After the attack graph is built, it gives a bird’s-eye view of possible intrusion 
scenarios. For each scenario, the probability of occurrence Prob is calculated as follows: 
 If the intrusion scenario is comprised of two serial intrusion actions    and 
  , then 
                                                     (3.1) 
where     and     are the local vulnerabilities exploited in the attack 
actions    and   . 
 If the intrusion scenario consists of two parallel intrusion actions    and 
  , then 
                                                  (3.2) 
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 If the intrusion scenario is more complicated, the calculation of its Prob 
will be the synthesis of (3.1) and (3.2). 
3.2.3 Intrusion Response System 
PMU
PMU
PMU
GPS Satellite
Communication Links
...
Data Concentrator
State Estimator
Real-Time Data
Server
Ethernet
Proposed algorithm
Control Center
EMS
 
Fig.  3.2.   Concept of IRS 
The concept of IRS is illustrated in Fig. 3.2. It is intended to be an application in 
the control center of a power system. The proposed algorithm, which will be discussed in 
detail in Section 3.3, obtains updated power network configurations from the State 
Estimator (SE), say, every 5 minutes. If an intrusion scenario is executed successfully, 
and it results in disruptions in power system operations such as breaker opening and loss 
of generation, such sudden changes of power network configurations will be reported to 
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the propose algorithm through SCADA systems in real time. The post-attack dynamical 
model of the power system is then built. After that, the algorithm extracts synchronized 
phasor measurements from the PMU data concentrator, which obtains real time PMU 
data from substations equipped with PMUs. Hence, a number of the state variables of the 
dynamical model are observed from PMU data. Based on the dynamical model and PMU 
measurements, CLEs are calculated to monitor the impact of an intrusion on power 
system dynamics.  
If CLEs only have low values, the prediction is that voltage instability will not 
happen; otherwise, voltage instability is likely to occur, and the proposed algorithm will 
send proper control signals to the Energy Management System (EMS) to prevent voltage 
instability. 
3.3 Proposed Algorithm 
3.3.1 Dynamical Model 
In this algorithm, generators are represented by classical models, and loads are 
represented by ZIP models. After a cyber intrusion, the dynamical model of a power 
system (n bus and m generators) is established as shown below: 
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                                                  (3.3) 
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                                (3.4) 
where            , and            .    is the rotor angle of generator j,  
   is the angular speed, and            is the power consumption at load bus i.      
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} (        ).    is the system frequency deviation in per unit. 
Excitation systems of generators are assumed to function in some way to keep 
internal voltage magnitudes at some reference values during a transient period. The time 
constant of modern excitation systems is less than 0.5s. If a new reference value is issued 
to an excitation system, the corresponding voltage magnitude will change rapidly due to 
the fast response of the excitation system. MCLEs will be computed based on an updated 
dynamical model to reassess system stability. 
Let x denote  |  |     |  |       |  |     
 , and y denote 
               
 . (3.3) and (3.4) are represented by: 
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Since 
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It is obtained that 
  
  
      
    
  
  
      
                                               (3.8) 
where    (resp.   ) denotes the Jacobian matrix of   with respect to   (resp.  ). When 
          and   
  
  
  , 
  
  
 has very large values. Correspondingly, the voltages x 
will change dramatically, and voltage instability is likely to happen. 
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3.3.2 Methodology: Conditional Lyapunov Exponents 
The notion of CLEs (originally called Sub-Lyapunov Exponents) is introduced by 
Pecora and Carroll in their study of synchronization of chaotic systems [43] and [44]. 
Similar to the full Lyapunov Exponents, CLEs are well defined ergodic invariants. 
Consider a N-dimensional continuous-time dynamical system 
  
  
     . If one 
split the state vector   into two vectors:     
 , and     
    (0<K<N), one will 
obtain two sub systems: 
   
  
           and 
   
  
          . Let                  
be the solution of the first sub system at time t starting from the initial conditions   
  
  ,   
    . The Conditional Lyapunov Exponents      for the sub system 
   
  
 
          are defined as eigenvalues of the following limiting. 
              
                     
    
             ̅      
                            (3.9) 
where i=1,2,…,K.            is the Jacobian matrix of            with respect to   , 
and  ̅      is the ith eigenvalue of      . The existence of CLEs is guaranteed under the 
same conditions that establish the existence of the Lyapunov Exponents [45]. 
0
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Fig.  3.3.   Nearby trajectories in the state space 
39 
 
The relationship between CLEs and system stability is discussed in the following. 
In ergodic theory of dynamical systems, the Lyapunov Exponents are used to characterize 
the exponential divergence or convergence of nearby trajectories, as shown in Fig. 3.3. 
For the sub system 
   
  
          , its Maximal Conditional Lyapunov Exponent 
(MCLE) determines the exponential convergence of nearby system trajectories. This is 
true due to the approximation of 
‖      ‖   
      ‖   
 ‖                                           (3.10) 
If 
   
  
 has very large values, the nearby system trajectories will diverge. Correspondingly, 
      . Otherwise, the nearby trajectories will converge, and MCLE has a low or 
even negative value. Therefore, the value of MCLE reveals the magnitude of time 
derivatives of related state variables. When the state variables are voltages of a power 
system, MCLE can be used to monitor the magnitude of time derivatives of the voltages, 
and hence voltage stability. 
3.3.3 Application of MCLE 
In this work, the dynamical system in (3.8) is split into n sub systems. The ith sub 
system has the state variables  |  |     
 , where i=1,2,…,n. MCLE is computed for each 
sub system to monitor voltage stability within it. 
Let   
  
  
      , one may obtain 
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where i=1,2,…,n.     , |  |   , and     , if there is no generator at bus i. As 
   
  
 is 
small, 
      
|  |                  
|  |
   
     
|  |                  
|  |
   
One can assume that    is diagonal in computation without compromising the 
accuracy, and then the ith sub system of (3.8) is represented by 
 |  |
  
  
     
             
    
  
  
   
         
                                              (3.11) 
where i=1,2,…,n.         is the element at the ith row and jth column of   . It is noted 
that 
 |  |
  
 
    
  
   if there is no generator at bus i, which is reasonable since the change 
of voltages at the load buses is driven by voltages at the generator buses. Consequently,  
 |  |
  
 and 
    
  
 do not depend on |  | and    . 
The proposed algorithm calculates MCLEs of the sub systems that have 
generators at the corresponding buses. The computation method is introduced in the 
following. 
3.3.4 Computation Method 
MCLEs are calculated over a limited time window. PMU measurements are 
extracted to observe time-varying values of the state variables of the sub systems. The 
unobservable part of the state variables is approximated through the Implicit Integration 
Method With Trapezoidal Rule in Subsection 2.5.2. The algorithm in Subsection 2.5.3, 
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the standard method with GSR, is then used to compute MCLEs. If values of MCLEs are 
over a predefined limit, it is predicted that voltage instability will happen. Control signals 
will be sent to EMS and initiate actions to prevent voltage instability. 
Selection of the length of time interval could be arbitrary. Study shows that 
MCLEs exhibit robustness to the length of time interval: MCLEs computed over different 
length time intervals all have very high values if voltage instability is going to happen. In 
this research, the time interval length is set to be 0.2s, so that it is short while it has 
enough PMU measurements. 
3.3.5 Control Actions 
When the value of MCLE of a sub system is over a predefined limit which is 
much greater than zero, the proposed algorithm will send a control signal to the excitation 
system of the generator related to the sub system through EMS. The reference value of 
the generator internal voltage magnitude is modified as follows: 
    
                         
       
                                     (12) 
where const is a predefined constant value. Voltage instability can be prevented with the 
fast response of the exciting system. 
3.4 Case Study 
Wind farm SCADA systems are selected for case study due to the fact that wind 
power is a fast emerging renewable resource on power grids, and it has the potential to 
affect the dynamical performance of power systems. 
Installed wind power capacity is increasing rapidly in recent years. The year 2008 
is a record year for wind generation in US with a total increase of 8,360 MW which is 
50% of the total wind capacity at the end of 2007 [46]. Wind energy accounts for 42% of 
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the total new capacity added. Report [47] from DOE anticipates that wind could power 
20% of U.S. grid by 2030. 
The increased and concentrated penetration of wind power makes the power 
network more dependent on wind energy production. Moreover, the newly installed large 
wind farms will be connected directly to high voltage transmission grids. Until recently, 
wind farms have been connected to the distribution system, which typically has either 
10/20 kV or 50/60 kV grids [48]. This situation means that future wind farms will be able 
to replace conventional power stations, and thus be active controllable elements in the 
power supply network. In other words, wind farms must be enabled with the control 
capabilities of a power plant [49]. 
The dynamic performance of power systems can be affected by wind farm 
operations. Cyber attacks on SCADA systems of wind farms present a potential threat for 
power system stability. There are special concerns for cyber security of wind power. 
Conventional generation is located in a facility that is at least somewhat secure 
physically, i.e., it probably has a fence and maybe even security guards. However, 
anybody can walk up to a wind turbine and knock on the door. 
3.4.1 Wind Farm SCADA Systems 
The generic network configuration of wind farm SCADA systems is identified 
and shown in Fig. 3.4. Every wind turbine is equipped with the Wind Turbine Control 
Panel (WTCP), which monitors and controls the wind turbine. WTCP is normally 
mounted in the tower base and is easily accessible. Through WTCPs, servers in a control 
room support monitoring and control of the wind turbines within a wind farm. However 
the control room is normally not staffed and it is only for maintenance occasions. Wind 
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farms in separated locations are integrated into a single EMS in a main control center 
through a control WAN. In a room that looks alike NASA Mission Control, system 
analysts oversee every turbine at the wind farms. The control center interfaces 
restrictively with corporate networks for business and operational reasons. 
WTCP
WT1
WTCP
WT2
WTCP
WTx
...
SCADA ServerWorkstation Data Storage
Control Room
Ethernet
WT=Wind turbine
WTCP=Wind turbine control panel
Application Server
Control WAN
SCADA ServerWorkstation Data Storage
Router
Redundant LAN
Firewall
Application Server
Main Control Center
Router
Firewall
Corporate LAN
View Node
Firewall
Engineering
Communication
Links
Remote Access
 
Fig.  3.4.   The generic network configuration of wind farm SCADA systems 
3.4.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
12 vulnerabilities are identified within the generic network configuration of wind 
farm SCADA systems. The vulnerabilities are illustrated in the following. 
Configuration management of WTCPs (r1) 
WTCP has the capability to change configuration settings of a wind turbine. It 
must support authentication for configuration updates as required by NERC CIP series. In 
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practice, it is generally equipped with a hardware token based or username-password 
based authentication [50]. 
The configuration management is questionable. WTCP is built on open ground, 
and it could be accessed by unauthorized individuals to gain physical access. Even 
though WTCP supports some user authentications such as a pin, the pin may be cracked. 
A pin can be cracked by a brute force attack. For example, if the key length of the 
pin is 6, there will be 10
6
 possible pins. The brute force attack will traverse the search 
space of possible pins until a correct one is found. There are a few techniques to help 
significantly reduce the search space. Hackers can try the initial factory password and 
some simplistic passwords, as people tend to use those passwords for pins. Hackers may 
also scan fingerprints on the pin pad left by authorized users. In the best-case scenario, 
hackers are able to identify the 6 keys of a 6-digit pin, which will reduce the possible pins 
to 720. 
The chemical combinatorial attack in [51] could be used to identify a pin directly. 
The attack consists in depositing on each pin pad key a small ionic salt quantity (e.g. 
some NaCl on key 0, some KCl on key 1, LiCl on key 2, SrCl2 on key 3, BaCl2 on key 4, 
CaCl2 on key 5...). As a user enters his or her pin, salts are mixed and leave the pin pad in 
a state where secret information can be leaked. The next phase of the attack includes 
collecting samples from the pin pad and analyzing these using a mass spectrometer. The 
attack is illustrated in Fig. 3.5 for PIN 1592. 
The chemical combinatorial attack could be dangerous for WTCPs. Unlike 
ATMs, only a few users such as maintenance personnel operate WTCPs, and they do not 
do it frequently. During a chemical combinatorial attack, the salts on a pin pad would not 
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be mixed evenly, and therefore give a clear hint of the pin. 
 
Fig.  3.5.   A chemical combinatorial attack 
Implicit trust between WTCPs and a control room (r2) 
The NERC Control System Security Working Group summarizes the problem of 
implicit trust exceptionally well on their website: 
Control systems are the “brains” of control and monitoring of the bulk electric 
system and other critical infrastructures, but they were designed for functionality 
and performance, not security. Most control systems assume an environment of 
complete and implicit trust. 
SCADA systems of wind farms operate in an environment of complete and 
implicit trust. The international standard IEC 61400-25: Communications for monitoring 
and control of wind power plants specifies data formats and information exchange 
methods for wind farms. IEC 61400-25 does not support any mechanism to authenticate 
and validate communication between wind turbines and a control room. It is left to the 
implementation of IEC 61400-25 to employ security mechanisms. Hence, SCADA 
systems could be influenced by injected traffic. 
Implicit trust between control rooms and a control center (r3) 
The implicit trust between control rooms and a control center is assumed when 
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the control WAN between them is a private utility Intranet. 
Wireless network (r4) 
Wireless technology is considered for SCADA systems of wind farms. The 
reasons are: 
1) Wireless technology has the advantages of reduced cost, flexibility of 
configuration, and ease of maintenance. 
2) Wireless network can be deployed in a tough terrain where wired 
infrastructure is difficult to install. 
3) Wireless communication could be used as a back-up for wired cables to 
ensure continuity of operations when the wired cables are broken or under 
attack. 
One example of wireless communication architecture for wind farms can be found 
in [52]. 
Wireless network is subject to common attacks including sniff, spoof, the man-in-
the-middle attack and DoS attack. Even if strong encryption and authentication are 
applied, wireless communication can still be affected by a jamming attack. 
A jamming attack occurs when a hacker analyzes the signal spectrum being used 
by a wireless network and then transmits a powerful signal to interfere with the 
communication on the discovered frequencies. A jamming attack is easy to implement in 
practice. For example, a Bluetooth device located within ten meters of an 802.11b 
network will cause a jamming. The jamming attack could force the wireless network to 
hold the transmissions until the disruptive signal no longer exists, or switch to a slower 
data transmission rate since data needs to be retransmitted from time to time. 
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Optical fibers (r5) 
Optical fibers are used heavily in communication infrastructures of wind farms. 
Optical fibers are glass or plastic that allows the propagation of light as a communication 
medium. It can be used for long distances without the need for signal enhancement. The 
optical fibers also offer high bandwidth capacities with a single fiber, being able to 
achieve transfer rates of up to 40 Gigabit/second. 
Optical fiber cables are simpler to tap than are generally believed. There are 
various optical fiber tapping methods. Splicing is the easiest form of tapping but it is 
detectable by most network security systems. Splicing will create a momentary lapse of 
data and is noticeable. More advanced tapping methods include injecting additional light 
into fiber cables and deducing the underlying optical signal by gauging certain 
interactions between the two. Bending fiber to create micro-bends can make light leak 
from the fiber without disrupting communication. This method is preferred in this 
context. 
 
Fig.  3.6.   An example of tapping 
Source: http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/security/?p=222&tag=leftCol;post-223. 
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Fig.  3.7.   The actual tap hardware 
Source: http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/security/?p=222&tag=leftCol;post-223. 
As described in reference [53], a hacker can purchase inexpensive hardware 
necessary to tap into a fiber. The tap consists of bending the fiber to a point that it leaks 
light, as shown in Fig. 3.6. A fiber cable is placed into a micro-bend clamping device. 
Then light leaks from the cable. An optical photo detector detects the leaking light and 
sends it to an optical-electrical converter. A converter changes the light pulses to 
electrical information and sends it to the hacker's PC through an Ethernet cable. Fig. 3.7 
is a photograph of actual tap hardware. 
Moreover, some tapping devices may be utilized not just for passive sniffing, but 
for active tapping, according to Oyster Optics [54]. Through such devices, a hacker is 
able to inject malicious signals into fiber cables. Those attacks are not detectable in real 
time. They are also difficult to locate, since the optical taps are subtle in nature. 
Fiber taps present a high risk for SCADA systems of wind farms. Wind farms are 
built on open ground, and many of them are not staffed. Hackers can gain physical access 
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to fiber optics. Although the fiber cables are normally buried underground, they can dig 
holes in order to reach the cables. 
Virtual Private Network (r6) 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) over the Internet is used in wind farm SCADA 
systems for remote communication. The IP Security (IPSEC) suite of protocols is 
commonly used to implement VPN. It offers authentication and encryption at the Internet 
Protocol (IP) packet level. 
DoS attacks using a Botnet or other means (e.g., SYN Flooding) cause a large 
number of compromised computers to flood a huge volume of network traffic toward a 
target server or a subnet to the extent of affecting or destabilizing the victim. When such 
an attack happens in a VPN, the data transmission rate will be severely affected. 
DoS attack may not disturb real-time operations of wind farms severely, as wind 
farm SCADA systems are highly-automated. However, hackers can use DoS attack to 
facilitate some other attacks. DoS attack can be used to block monitoring and control 
operations of wind farm operators so that other attacks are able to proceed. 
Digital Microwave (r7) 
Licensed digital microwave changes the continuous signal used by analog 
microwave to a digital signal. This allows for greater data transmission rates with better 
data integrity. It is commonly used within control WANs. 
Digital microwave radio point-to-point communications may be encrypted using a 
variety of technologies. Current vendor offerings include the use of OpenSSL protocol 
suite to the National Security Agency (NSA) Type 1. Encryption does impact the data 
transfer rate associated with the link. 
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Poor access control within a control room (r8) 
The idea of access control is to grant no more than necessary access to each user. 
An appropriate access control policy is extremely critical to cyber security. However, 
perfect access control is almost impossible to achieve due to the scale and complexity of 
cyber systems. Poor access control will grant some users inappropriate levels of access, 
leading to security vulnerabilities. 
Poor access control within a control center (r9) 
Same as above. 
Bad configuration of remote access (r10) 
Remote access is exposed to public. If not secured properly, it will be the start 
point of cyber attacks. 
Weak firewall policy (r11) 
Weak firewall policy results in unwanted inbound and outbound traffic. 
Human errors (r12) 
Human errors can interfere with normal operations of SCADA systems. A trusted 
user of SCADA systems can cause an internal attack. Hackers outside may gain access to 
SCADA systems through malware introduced by phishing and infected portable storage 
devices. Oversight or negligence during key generation, distribution and management 
could cause critical information to be corrupted. 
3.4.3 DERFEM and Attack Graph 
The vulnerabilities are evaluated through DERFEM. The results are shown in 
Table 3.2. An attack graph is built as shown in Fig. 3.8. Nine possible intrusion scenarios 
are identified; the probability of occurrence of every scenario is calculated, shown in 
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Table 3.3. 
Table  3.2.   The results of DERFEM 
 r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 Vul(ri) 
r1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 
r2 0.6 1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.75 
r3 0.4 0.6 1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 
r4 0.5 0.4 0.6 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5714 
r5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 
r6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.25 
r7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.125 
r8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.625 
r9 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.25 
r10 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 1 0.6 0.4 0.6667 
r11 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
r12 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 1 0.375 
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Fig.  3.8.   The constructed attack graph 
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z1 (Hacker, WTCP, 5) 
z2 (Hacker, WTCP, 0) 
z3 (Hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 2) 
z4 (Hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 0) 
z5 (Hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 1) 
z6 (Hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 4) 
z7 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 3) 
z8 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 0) 
z9 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 4) 
z10 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 2) 
z11 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 0) 
z12 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 5) 
z13 (Hacker, workstation in the control room, 5) 
z14 (Hacker, workstation in the control room, 0) 
z15 (Hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 5) 
z16 (Hacker, workstation in the control center, 5) 
z17 (Hacker, workstation in the control center, 0) 
z18 (Hacker, workstation in the corporate LAN, 5) 
z19 (Hacker, workstation in the corporate LAN, 0) 
z20 (Hacker, remote access point, 5) 
z21 (Hacker, remote access point, 0) 
a1  (Password cracking, z2, z1, r1) 
a2  (Jamming, z4, z3, r4) 
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a3  (Passive tapping, z4, z5, r5) 
a4  (Man-in-the-middle attack, z7, z6, r2) 
a5  (Active tapping, z8, z7, r5) 
a6  (Spoof, z9, z6, r2) 
a7  (Spoof, z10, z9, r3) 
a8  (DOS attack, z11, z10, r6) 
a9  (Jamming, z11, z10, r7) 
a10  (Spoof, z12, z6, r2) 
a11 (Internal attack, z8, z12, r12) 
a12  (Malware infection, z13, z12, r8) 
a13  (Infected portable storage device attack, z14, z13, r12) 
a14  (Malware infection, z15, z12, r3) 
a15  (Malware infection, z16, z15, r9) 
a16  (Infected portable storage device attack, z17, z16, r12) 
a17  (Malware infection, z18, z16, r11) 
a18  (Infected portable storage device attack, z19, z18, r12) 
a19  (Phishing, z19, z18, r12) 
a20  (Malware infection, z20, z18, r10) 
a21  (Infected portable storage device attack, z21, z20, r12) 
a22 (Phishing, z21, z20, r12) 
The intrusion scenarios show that, if successfully executed, a hacker will gain 
some levels of control access to several or even hundreds of WTCPs. The power output 
of compromised wind farms will be maliciously manipulated. The impact on power 
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system dynamics is studied next. 
Table  3.3.   The intrusion scenarios and the probabilities 
Intrusion scenario Probability 
a1 1 
a2 0.5714 
a3 0.5 
a5-> a4 or a11-> a10 0.5508 
a8 (or a9)-> a7-> a6 0.1289 
a13-> a12-> a10 0.1758 
a16-> a15-> a14-> a10 0.0352 
a18 (or a19)-> a17-> a15-> a14-> a10 0.0176 
a21 (or a22)-> a20-> a17-> a15-> a14-> a10 0.0117 
 
3.4.4 Simulation Results 
 
Fig.  3.9.   IEEE 10 Generator 39 Bus System 
The IEEE 39 bus system [55] is used for simulations, shown in Fig. 3.9. 
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Generator G5 and G9 (marked with two rectangles) are replaced by two wind farms 
comprised of the variable speed wind turbines utilizing Doubly Fed Induction Generators 
(DFIGs). The rating value of a wind turbine is 2.0 MW. From the system’s point of view, 
the wind farms are considered as constant negative loads during the transient period, due 
to the fast control capacity of the power electronic technology within wind turbines. The 
other generators are classically modeled; the loads are represented by ZIP models. 
MCLEs are calculated for the generator buses (except G5 and G9) by the 
proposed algorithm every 0.2s to monitor power system stability. Suppose that at t=0.4s, 
a hacker maliciously manipulates the power output of G5 (or G9) to some extent. Part of 
the simulation results is shown in Table 3.4. The simulation results show that 
 The values of MCLEs are close to 0, when the power system is in the 
steady state. 
 Upon an attack, the values of MCLEs oscillate as time evolves, but have 
limited values if voltage instability is not likely to happen. During Attack 
2, the reactive power output of G5 is reduced by 10 Mvar at t=0.4s. 
MCLEs increase for a while, and then decrease, as shown in Fig. 3.10(a). 
The values are below 200. 
 The values of MCLEs constantly increase as time evolves, if voltage 
instability is likely to happen within the power system. During Attack 10, 
the reactive power output of G5 is reduced by half at t=0.4s. Voltage 
instability happens at t=1.42s, as shown in Fig. 3.10(c) and (d). The values 
of MCLEs keep increasing after the attack, as shown in Fig. 3.10(b). 
 Voltage instability is likely to occur around the generator buses where 
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MCLEs have high values. Take Attack 10 as an example, MCLEs of G2, 
G3, G4, G6 and G7 (circled in Fig. 3.9) are over 1000 at t=1.4s. Time-
domain simulation results show that voltage instability happens around 
those generator buses. It is reasonable as G2, G3, G4, G6 and G7 are close 
to G5. 
Table  3.4.   MCLE of bus G3 
MCLEG3 0-0.2s 0.2s-0.4s 0.4s-0.6s 0.6s-0.8s 0.8s-1s 1s-1.2s 1.2s-1.4s 1.4s-1.6s 1.6s-1.8s Voltage Instability 
Attack 1 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 9.88E-1 2.77 3.84 3.69 2.96 3.55 7.29 N/A 
Attack 2 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 7.25 2.81E1 6.23E1 1.14E2 1.90E2 1.83E2 6.98E1 N/A 
Attack 3 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 6.90E1 2.11E2 3.94E2 6.83E2 1.22E3   t=1.57s 
Attack 4 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 1.17E2 4.08E2 9.12E2 1.98E3    t=1.20s 
Attack 5 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 -1.01 -2.27 -3.16 -4.08 -4.58 -4.23 -2.78 N/A 
Attack 6 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 6.04 2.21E1 4.65E1 8.18E1 1.32E2 1.09E2 4.81 N/A 
Attack 7 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 3.45E1 1.05E2 2.00E2 3.51E2 6.12E2 1.10E3 2.17E3 t=1.86s 
Attack 8 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 1.05E2 3.48E2 7.27E2 1.43E3    t=1.24s 
Attack 9 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 2.31E2 7.65E2 1.72E3     t=1.03s 
Attack 10 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 7.12E1 2.45E2 5.27E2 1.03E3 2.05E3   t=1.42s 
Attack 11 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 3.55E2 1.37E3      t=0.8s 
Attack 12 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 2.91E2 1.03E3 2.72E3     t=1.06s 
Attack 13 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 8.33E2       t=0.76s 
Attack 14 -2.77E-3 -2.62E-2 6.43E1 2.07E2 4.10E2 7.47E2 1.38E3   t=1.56s 
 
Attack 1 PGen of G5 is reduced by 10 MW 
Attack 2 QGen of G5 is reduced by 10 Mvar 
Attack 3 PGen of G5 is reduced by 100 MW 
Attack 4 QGen of G5 is reduced by 100 Mvar 
Attack 5 PGen of G9 is reduced by 10 MW 
Attack 6 QGen of G9 is reduced by 7.5 Mvar 
Attack 7 PGen of G9 is reduced by 100 MW 
Attack 8 QGen of G9 is reduced by 75 Mvar 
Attack 9 PGen of G5 is reduced by half 
Attack 10 QGen of G5 is reduced by half 
Attack 11 QGen of G5 is reduced to -QGen 
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Attack 12 PGen of G9 is reduced by half 
Attack 13 PGen of G5 is reduced by half; QGen of G5 is reduced by half; PGen of 
G9 is reduced by half 
Attack 14 PGen of G5 is reduced by 30 MW; QGen of G5 is reduced by15 Mvar; 
PGen of G9 is reduced by 50 MW; QGen of G9 is reduced by 10 Mvar 
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(c) 
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(f) 
Fig.  3.10.   The simulation results 
Based on the simulation results, a predefined limit for values of MCLEs is set to 
be 800. If the value of MCLE of a generator bus exceeds the limit, it is predicted that 
voltage instability will happen around the generator bus. Control signal 
    
                         
       
 
will be sent to the excitation system of the related generator. Simulation results show that 
voltage instability can be avoided. For example, during Attack 10, MCLEs of G3, G4, G6 
and G7 are over 800 at t=1.2s. The corresponding control signals are then sent to G3, G4, 
G6 and G7. Voltage instability is prevented, as shown in Fig. 3.10(e) and (f). 
3.5 Discussion 
A risk assessment framework with a PMU-based IRS is proposed for power 
control systems. The main idea of IRS is to calculate MCLEs for generator buses, in 
order to monitor voltage stability. The higher values MCLEs have, the more likely 
voltage instability can occur around the corresponding generator buses. MCLE method is 
based on a solid analytical foundation and it is validated by simulation results.  
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS 
This research leads to significant contributions to the development of a more 
reliable and secure power grid. A new method is proposed to prevent power systems from 
a loss of synchronism; a risk assessment framework is developed to mitigate the impact 
of cyber attacks on power system dynamics. The Lyapunov Exponents are applied to the 
analysis of power system dynamics. This work also results in an innovative application of 
PMU data. As large scale deployment of PMUs on power grids continues, it is important 
to develop new applications of PMU data. It is believed that this research is an important 
step toward the goal. 
Future research includes: 
1) For a large power system with numerous generators, it is difficult to 
establish a dynamical system model to represent the power system during 
a contingency. The power system model may be simplified based on 
reasonable assumptions. For example, multiple generators that tend to 
swing together may be represented by an aggregated model. 
2) As power systems grow in scale and complexity, it may be more difficult 
to determine the time interval length for MLE merely by the proposed 
spectrum analysis. An on-line pattern recognition technique coupled with 
spectrum analysis may be used to determine the size of T. The dynamic 
patterns in a power system can be divided into classes, e.g., fast and slow. 
Each pattern of dynamic variations is to be assigned a different time 
interval length T based on spectrum analysis of the power swings 
following disturbances. When a disturbance occurs, a pattern recognition 
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technique is used to recognize the type of perturbation. A fast perturbation 
can be detected by a short time window, while a slow pattern will require 
a longer time window. MLE is then calculated over the corresponding 
time interval length T. 
3) Further work is needed to draw a definitive conclusion about the 
relationship between the value of MLE and the size of stability margin. 
4) For a large cyber system with numerous security vulnerabilities, DERFEM 
may not be sufficient. Some statistical analysis techniques may be coupled 
with DERFEM to improve evaluation results. 
5) A dedicated control strategy can be developed in IRS for the control 
actions to prevent voltage instability. It will require advanced knowledge 
of generator excitation systems. 
6) Many new PMUs will be installed in the future. The placement of new 
PMUs for complete observability should be investigated. An integer 
quadratic programming approach [56] may be used for an optimal 
placement of PMUs. Complete observability should be ensured under 
normal as well as contingency operating conditions. 
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